Commentary : separating the business cycle from other economic fluctuations by Charles Bean
It is always a pleasure to read a Bob Hall paper because one knows
that one will be forced to think anew about an issue. So, it is even more
of a pleasure to be invited here to discuss his paper on business cycles.
The kernel of Bob’s argument is that the movements in the main U.S.
macroeconomic aggregates, both at cyclical frequencies and longer, are
the natural consequence of a well-functioning economy responding to
shocks to productivity and real spending. Far from following a relatively
smooth trend, potential output is stochastic. Indeed, in the canonical
model, there is no Keynesian-style output gap at all. 
The claim that business cycle fluctuations are primarily an equilib-
rium response to real shocks, particularly to productivity, was originally
advanced more than 20 years ago by Finn Kydland and Ed Prescott
(1982). Bob provides similar evidence in his paper today. But how
convincing is that evidence? Not very, I would argue. For the fact that
the data can be explained reasonably well by a suitably calibrated
neoclassical growth model subject to the right sort of shocks does not
mean that they necessarily are generated in this fashion.
Bob’s evidence for the importance of productivity disturbances relies
on a decomposition of output growth in which relatively little of the
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recorded inputs and a large fraction to total factor productivity. But
total factor productivity is measured as a residual, so measurement
errors in output and inputs end up here, inflating the estimated contri-
bution of productivity disturbances. More significantly, no allowance is
made for variable factor utilization over the cycle. Indeed, it is precisely
the existence of match-specific capital of the type that subsequently
appears in Bob’s own characterization of the labor market that makes
labor hoarding during downturns potentially so important. Neither of
these objections is new, and Bob acknowledges them in passing. But to
me, they constitute a reason for skepticism, especially when other
approaches, such as the structural vector-autoregressions of Olivier
Blanchard and Danny Quah (1989) and their many imitators, suggest
that the contribution of technology to output fluctuations at business
cycle frequencies is rather more modest. 
Partly because of that evidence, much recent business-cycle research
has been directed to incorporating Keynesian-style sticky prices and
wages into the workhorse neoclassical growth model. Bob is some-
what dismissive of the importance of sticky prices, noting that while
a lot of effort has gone into rationalizing why prices might be sticky,
rather little effort has been devoted to explaining why sellers post
prices rather than undertaking bilateral bargaining in the first place.
And, to be sure, such bilateral bargaining does take place for many
intermediate products. But thank goodness it doesn’t occur in the
retail sector, otherwise, the lines at the supermarket checkout would
be enormous!
One of the least satisfactory features of the early real business cycle
models lies in the absence of a compelling explanation for fluctuations
in employment and unemployment. Sufficient variability in employ-
ment is only possible in a market-clearing world if labor supply is very
elastic with respect to the wage. But that runs against microeconomic
evidence suggesting that labor supply is relatively wage-inelastic. Various
ingenious solutions have been suggested, including intertemporal non-
separability in leisure and the introduction of fixed costs of working. But
none of these solutions are very convincing.
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 Bob argues that the way forward here is the recognition that workers
and jobs are heterogeneous and cannot be costlessly matched to each
other. Instead, forming a job match requires a capital investment in
search, hiring, and training by both sides. The presence of such sunk
costs then means there is a post-match surplus to be shared between
employee and employer. In the standard matching model of Dale
Mortensen and Chris Pissarides (1994), the wage is assumed to be a
weighted average of the outside options of the worker and the firm,
both of which are sensitive to the state of the labor market. Hence,
these models do not generate much variability in employment. But
Bob observes that it is not credible for either party to threaten to take
its outside option. As a result, a range of wages can be supported as
equilibria, and these may well be rather less responsive to the state of
the labor market than in the standard model. However, although the
equilibrium wage has no effect on the continuation of existing
matches, it does affect the rate at which new job vacancies are opened.
This is an important insight, which produces a credible explanation
for wage rigidity and for substantial fluctuations in unemployment.
However, this is a model of real, not nominal, wage rigidity.1 It
provides an explanation why fluctuations in output may be associated
with substantial fluctuations in unemployment, but not why shocks to
nominal spending might have real effects. Bob is implicitly of the view
that such shocks are transmitted very largely into prices even in the
short run. The problem with this conclusion is that it runs against the
very large empirical literature which concludes that nominal distur-
bances in the shape of monetary policy shocks have substantial real
effects at horizons out to a year or more (see, for instance, the survey
by Larry Christiano, Marty Eichenbaum, and Charles Evans, 2000).
Now it is possible that this literature is fundamentally flawed and that
the monetary policy disturbances in those exercises are merely proxy-
ing omitted real variables that shift equilibrium output. But I doubt it.
So, to me, the evidence still suggests that nominal rigidities, whether
in prices or wages or both, are a part of the story of the business cycle.
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 But here, Bob’s characterization of the labor market may have some-
thing to offer those who think sticky prices are important, for the
presence of real rigidities is necessary to ensure that nominal rigidities
have purchase (see Larry Ball and David Romer, 1990). So, if nominal
prices are sticky because of a fixed cost of changing prices, but real
wages are very responsive to unemployment, a fall in nominal demand
and employment will lead to substantial fall in wages and in costs,
making a cut in nominal prices worth undertaking. Only if real wages
are relatively unresponsive to activity can nominal prices remain fixed. 
What does this all imply for the conduct of monetary policy? Rela-
tively little is said in the paper about monetary policy, but what there
is, is framed in the context of the eponymous Taylor rule, which makes
the deviation of the real policy rate from its neutral level an increasing
function of the deviation of inflation from target and of the output
gap. Bob’s analysis implies that both the neutral real rate—if we can
even measure it properly—and potential output move over time in
ways that may be hard to predict. Indeed since his is an equilibrium
model of fluctuations, the output gap presumably should always be
identically zero.
As already indicated, I do not buy the argument that nominal rigidi-
ties are unimportant, in which case, unless there are multiple equilibria,
one in principle could define an output gap. But even then, is it a useful
construct? Bob’s straw man policymaker takes output, fits a Hodrick-
Prescott filter through it, and then plugs the resulting detrended output
series into the Taylor rule in order to set the policy rate. This, he argues,
is a misguided approach if potential GDP is stochastic.
But I don’t know of any central banker who behaves like this (and if
they did, they probably wouldn’t be in a job very long). Taylor’s rule
originally was meant as a rough, reduced-form empirical description,
not a prescription for how policy should be set. One of the oddities of
macroeconomics over the last 30 years is the way we have moved from
assuming that policymakers optimize and private agents act like
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 automatons to its polar opposite, whereas, in fact, both are presumably
optimizing, after a fashion, given the information constraints they face. 
When central bankers deliberate over interest rates, we form a view
of the outlook for inflation and output over the medium term
together with the attendant risks, and then make a judgment on the
appropriate policy stance in the light of that outlook. An assessment
of the slack in the economy is an essential ingredient in forming that
view, but it is not made merely by fitting a smooth trend through
GDP. Instead our staffs employ models of varying complexity in
which potential output and the natural rate of unemployment evolve
stochastically in the way modern macroeconomic thinking suggests
and also rely heavily on other sources of information, including a
whole range of official data and business surveys. And we are acutely
aware of the uncertainties, treating statistical estimates of the output
gap with a very considerable degree of skepticism. 
To conclude, Bob Hall is certainly right to highlight the fact that
potential output is not a smooth trend, and that the natural rate of
unemployment and the neutral rate of interest are not constants. But
I fear that policymakers cannot dispense with the concepts altogether.
If the bulk of output fluctuations represent movements in the equilib-
rium of the economy, then surely, at a minimum, we need to have
some idea how that equilibrium is likely to evolve if we are to stabilize
prices effectively. And if, as I believe the evidence suggests, nominal
rigidities are an important ingredient of the business cycle, then some
assessment of the slack in the economy is also essential. Making that
assessment is surely very difficult, but that will come as no surprise to
those engaged in making policy.
Commentary 185
 Endnote
1Hall (2005) suggests that the equilibrium wage should drift up with the trend in
the general price level, so preserving long-run monetary neutrality but leaving open
the possibility of temporary deviations from neutrality. In that case, the natural rate
of unemployment and potential output would correspond to the equilibrium after
these temporary deviations had been eliminated, and there would be conceptually
well-defined (though possibly hard to measure) unemployment and output gaps. 
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